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THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW CONCEPTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE (A SYMPOSIUM)
Courts have recently been troubled by the
application of age-old criminal law concepts to
offenses against modem criminal law. Such com-
mon law terms as "moral turpitude," "infamous
crime," and "crimes against the public morals"
have received attention in cases ranging from in-
come tax violations to a prosecution for obscene
telephone calls.
The first paper in this series, "Tax Evasion And
Moral Turpitude," examines the question of
whether income tax evasion is necessarily a crime
involving moral turpitude and it also deals with
the related problem of summary disbarment.
The second paper "Infamy And The 0F/ice-
holder," traces the history and application of the
infamous crime concept and suggests a new test
of infamy to meet current problems concerning the
right of one convicted of a crime to hold public
office.
What are crimes against the public morals and
how that common law concept is utilized by the
courts today are the questions answered by the
third paper in this series, "Common Law Crimes
Against The Public Morals." The concluding paper,
"The Constitutionality Of Prosecutions For Crimes
Against The Public Morals," measures this ancient
concept against the demands of due process, and
suggests some answers as to whether it is a vital
principle of today's criminal law or an outmoded
relic in the light of modern constitutional guaran-
tees.
1. Tax Evasion and Moral Turpitude
DAVID H. KLEIMAN
In 1956, Abraham Teitelbaum, a Chicago
attorney, pleaded guilty to an indictment al-
leging willful and fraudulent income tax evasion.
Following a conviction, an action was instituted
in federal district court calling for the disbarment
of Teitelbaum from the practice of law in the
federal courts. In a memorandum opinion, it was
held that even though there had been a felony
conviction, Teitelbaum's actions did not involve
moral turpitude and therefore did not warrant
disbarment.1
After the federal action, the Chicago Bar Asso-
ciation instituted an original proceeding before the
Illinois Supreme Court charging Teitelbaum with
conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude and
recommending his disbarment from practice be-
fore the Illinois courts. The Teitelbaum case raises
serious problems that have troubled both state and
federal courts.
Thus far the several courts which have con-
sidered the problem have failed to achieve uni-
formity of decision on the question of whether an
attorney who is convicted of income tax evasion
should be disbarred, and if so, whether there
might be some extenuating circumstances which
should save him from disbarment.
The historical origin of the moral turpitude
concept in relation to disbarment proceedings
sheds little light on the cases involving tax evasion.
The early cases do not indicate why the courts
I Teitelbaum was convicted for a violation of 26
U.S.C., Section 145(b) by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division. He pleaded guilty to one count and hollo
contendere to a second and was given a suspended sen-
tence. The disbarment decision was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit and
affirmed without comment upon the merits of the
action. The United States Attorney who appealed the
case was severely reprimanded for appealing a case of
this type.
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adopted the moral turpitude test, but its present
day acceptance is reflected in the disciplinary
proceedings of a majority of the jurisdictions in
the United States where it has been adopted,
either by statute or common law, as the controlling
method of determining whether an attorney's
acts warrant disbarment.2 Notwithstanding its
widespread use, the courts have failed to clarify
the scope of the moral turpitude concept in relation
to disbarment.3
In their efforts to achieve a satisfactory defini-
tion of moral turpitude, the courts have been
faced with the problem of arriving at a definition
that is restrictive enough to facilitate application
to a particular fact situation and yet not so broad
as to distort the statutory intent. In this context
moral turpitude is generally defined as a base or
vile act that violates the accepted social relation-
ship among men.4 This definition, however, is not
completely satisfactory, and the courts generally
base their decision upon the fact situation involved
in the particular case. 5 Moreover, this procedure
has not been conductive to obtaining uniformity
among the various jurisdictions.
Disbarment proceedings are generally initiated
by a bar association in an original proceeding
before the state supreme court.6 Before the case
goes to the state supreme court, the facts are
usually investigated by a bar association com-
mittee acting under the direction of the court. That
2 Illinois: In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19
(1936). The court held that in Illinois, even without a
statute on the subject, a judgment of conviction of an
attorney of a crime involving moral turpitude is grounds
for disbarment. Louisiana: Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Steiner, 204 La. 1073, 16 So.2d 843 (1944). Louisiana
State Bar Ass'n v. Connolly, 201 La. 342, 9 So.2d582
(1942). This list is not exhaustive and reference to dis-
barment proceedings in states not included under foot-
note 2 will establish the use of the term moral turpitude
in that particular jurisdiction.
3 For a complete summary of the various interpreta-
tions given by courts to the term moral turpitude in
construing disbarment statutes, see 27 W. & P. PERm.
(1940).
4 The definition most commonly quoted by the courts
is found in Bouvier's Law Dictionary which calls moral
turpitude:
"An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private or social duties which a man owes to his fellow-
men or to society in general, contrary to the customary
and accepted rules of right and duty between man and
man."
5See note 11, infra.
6 For the procedures applicable in the various juris-
dictions, see BRAND, BAR AsSOCIATIONS, ATTORNEYs,
AND JUrGES (1956). This information may also be
found in the statutes and rules applicable to the various
courts.
committee recommends to the bar association
whether or not a disbarment action should be
instigated.
While disbarment may be either regular or
summary, moral turpitude is decisive in each. In
the regular disbarment procedure, the bar associa-
tion and the attorney introduce evidence from
which the court will determine whether moral
turpitude was involved. If the court is convinced
that the attorney's acts involved moral turpitude,
a judgment for disbarment will be rendered. In a
summary disbarment procedure, the records of
conviction for the crime involved is the only
evidence introduced. Therefore, the crime must
necessarily and inherently involve moral turpitude.
7
The effect of this is to relieve the bar association
from the necessity of introducing any evidence to
prove moral turpitude other than the record of
conviction. Similarly, the attorney will not have
an opportunity to introduce evidence to disprove
the presence of moral turpitude.
States which do not have provisions for summary
disbarment are still faced with the question of
whether a crime necessarily and inherently involves
moral turpitude if they employ a semi-summary
procedure. This situation arises where the bar
association introduces into evidence only the record
of conviction and makes it incumbent upon the
court to determine whether the particular crime
necessarily involves moral turpitude.8 The attorney
will have an opportunity to refute the contention
that moral turpitude is involved; but if he fails to
do so and the court is convinced from the nature
of the crime that moral turpitude is necessarily
and inherently involved, disbarment will be
decreed upon the sole evidence of the conviction
record.
The advantages of the summary and semi-
summary 9 procedures are apparent. The amount of
7The requirement that the crime necessarily and
inherently involve moral turpitude to support a sum-
mary disbarment was developed by Judge Traynor
In re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 242, 272 P.2d 768 (1954).
The case is discussed in more detail later in this paper.
8 This situation is exemplified in the Teitelbaum
case. Illinois has no provisions for summary disbarment.
Teitelbaum cannot be denied the right, therefore, of
introducing evidence. The question is whether the
Chicago Bar Association must introduce any evidence
showing moral turpitude other than the certificate of
conviction itself. If it does not, the proceeding becomes
one of a semi-summary nature.
9 For the purposub of simplicity, whether speaking
of semi-summary disbarment or summary disbarment
reference will be made to the latter due to the similarity
between the application of the two systems.
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evidence and time involved under these procedures
is less than in the regular disbarment proceeding
where evidence relating to the attorney's conduct
in committing the offense must be presented to
prove the moral turpitude.
While a crime involving moral turpitude com-
mitted in any capacity may result in disbarment,10
the courts have drawn a distinction between the
attorney-client relationship and the individual
capacity concept in respect to evidential require-
ments. Thus, when an act is committed in the
attorney's individual capacity, the courts generally
have required (1) a conviction of a crime, and (2)
that the nature of the crime be such that it would
result in the loss of confidence of the attorney's
clients if his name were to remain on the roll of the
bar." Where the violation is of the fiduciary
10In re Cruickshank, 47 Cal. App. 496, 190 Pac.
1038 (1920), the attorney had been convicted of ob-
taining money by false pretenses. He defended him-
self in a disbarment proceeding upon the theory that
he was not in the practice of law when the act was
committed. This theory was rejected on the grounds
that it is immaterial in what capacity the defendant
acted when he was disbarred. A somewhat similar
problem was raised In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267
Pac. 452 (1928). Dampier, an attorney who had been
convicted in a federal court for sending obscene letters
through the mail, defended a disbarment action lodged
against him on the statute. The Idaho Supreme Court
agreed with Dampier saying the object of the disbar-
ment statute was to protect the public "against unpro-
fessional, improper, and unauthorized practice of law,
unprofessional conduct of members of the bar." It was
then concluded that disbarment would not lie for a
felony conviction in another jurisdiction when the act
was not a crime in Idaho.
"1 Acs in Attorney's Individual Capacity: adultery,
Grievance Comm. v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 Adt.
292 (1930), fraud, In re Hopkins, 54 Wash. 569, 103
Pac. 805 (1909), larceny, In re Liliopoulos, 175 Wash.
338, 27 P.2d 691 (1933), mail fraud, In re Comyns,
132 Wash. 391, 232 Pac. 269 (1925), prohibition viola-
tion, In re Finch, 156 Wash. 609, 287 Pac. 677 (1930),
contra, Bartos v. United States, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1927), receiving stolen goods, In re Kirby, 10 S.D. 322,
73 N.W. 92 (1897), seduction, In re Wallace, 323 Mo.
203, 19 S.W.2d 625 (1929), draft evasion, In re
McAllister, 14 Cal.2d 602, 95 P.2d 932 (1939), narcotics,
In re Pontarelli, 393 Ill. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83 (1946),
subrersion, In re McNeese, 346 Mo. 425, 142 S.W.2d
33 (1940).
Acts In Attorney's Fiduciary Capacity: false evidence,
In re Carr, 377 Ill. 140, 36 N.E.2d 243 (1941), false
claims, In re Wiltse, 109 Wash. 261, 186 Pac. 848 (1920),
fraud, In re Hopkins, 54 Wash. 569, 103 Pac. 805 (1909),
character assault, In re Humphrey, 174 Cal. 290, 163
Pac. 60 (1917), negligence, In re McGarry, 380 Ill. 359,
44 N.E.2d 7 (1942), conspiracy, In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d
93, 82 P.2d 442 (1938), extortion, Libarian v. State Bar,
38 Cal.2d 328, 239 P.2d 865 (1952), undue delegation,
McGregor v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 283, 148 P.2d 865
(1944), misrepresentation, In re Copland, 66 Ohio App.
304, 33 N.E.2d 857 (1940), allooing rebates, In re
relationship, the attorney may be disbarred for
non-criminal acts.
12
Tax evasion has proved an exceptionally diffi-
cult problem for courts that must apply the moral
turpitude test to disbarment cases. This is espe-
cially true when the courts utilize a summary
procedure and have to justify a holding that
income tax evasion inherently involves moral
turpitude. This justification was predicated upon a
long line of cases that held any crime involving
fraud to involve moral turpitude.1 3 It thus became
necessary to show that income tax evasion involves
some fraudulent act. The Internal Revenue Code
which provides for the conviction of "any person
who attempts in any manner to defeat any tax" is
of little help since it does not mention any require-
ment of fraudulent conduc 14 The proponents of
Alschuler, 388 Ill. 492, 58 N.E.2d 563 (1944), false
swearing, In re King, 165 Ore. 103, 105 P.2d 870 (1940).
The rationale in these cases is stated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Marsh v. State Bar, 210 Cal.
303, 291 Pac. 583 (1930):
"Neither can it be denied that the breach by peti-
tioner of the confidential relationship-a fiduciary re-
lation of the very highest character, binding him to the
most conscientious fidelity-between himself and his
said clients involved moral turpitude."
Petitioner was charged and susequently disbarred
for failure to file actions for which he was retained and
failure to appear in court thereby allowing a default
judgment against his client.
'3The United States Supreme Court settled the
question of whether moral turpitude includes fraud
while reviewing an order to deport an alien on the basis
of a crime involving moral turpitude where the alien
was convicted of perpetrating fraud on the government.
In that case, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951),
the court said:
"Whatever else the phrase 'crime involving moral
turpitude' may mean in the peripheral cases, the de-
cided cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was
an ingredient have always been regarded as involving
moral turpitude .... Fraud is the touchstone by which
this case should be judged. The phrase 'crime involving
moral turpitude' has without exception been construed
to embrace fraudulent conduct."
14 Henceforth, when speaking of income tax evasion,
the reference will be to Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
§145(a) and (b), or the historical predecessors to these
sections.
26 U.S.C. §145(b)-"Failure to collect and pay over
tax, or attempt to defeat or evade tax. Any person
requlred under this chapter to collect, account for,
and pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who
willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and
pay over such tax, and any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax-
imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof,
shall in addition to other penalties provided by law,
be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof,
be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for
not more than five years, or both, together with the
costs of prosecution."
It will be noted that subsection (a) of Section 145
19581
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summary disbarment, however, argue from the
following syllogism to show that income tax
evasion necessarily involves moral turpitude:
(1) Any crime involving fraud is moral turpi-
tude.
(2) Income tax evasion involves fraud.
(3) Therefore income tax evasion involves moral
turpitude.
About the first premise there is little question,
as the United States Supreme Court has conclu-
sively decided that the "phrase 'crime involving
moral turpitude' has without exception been
construed to embrace fraudulent conduct."" The
difficulty lies with the second premise, for there
has been considerable judicial confusion about
the inclusion of fraud as an element of income
tax evasion.
The Internal Revenue Code speaks in terms of
"willfulness" which has been judicially interpreted
to mean "bad faith," "bad motive," and "tax
evasion motive."' 6 It has also been said that
"willfully" denotes an intentional or voluntary act
and when used in a criminal statute it generally
means an act done with a bad purpose. 7 On this
rationale it has been held by some courts that the
word "willfully" in the Internal Revenue Code is
synonomous with the word fraudulent. 18
provides for penalties of another sort, and makes
the crime involved a misdemeanor. This section is
as follows:
"Failure to file returns, submit information or pay
tax .... " In 1954 the Internal Revenue Code was re-
cast, but the substance of these two sections was em-
bodied in Title 26, Sections 7201 and 7203.
"Section 7201. Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax. Any
person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade
or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the pay-
ment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties pro-
vided bylaw, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or im-
prisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with costs of prosecution."
"Section 7203. Willfid Failure to File Return, Supply
Information, or Pay Tax... be guilty of a misde-
meanor..."
Is See note 13, supra.
16 Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131 (1956);
Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1942); Wardlow
v. United States, 230 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1953). Contra,
United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (1931); United
States v. Albanese, 117 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
'7 In United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933)
the defendant was indicted for refusing to give testi-
mony and supply information as to deductions claimed
in his income tax returns, claiming that it would in-
criminate him in violation of the fifth amendment. The
court had to construe the word "willfully" as used in
the statute and in doing so established the principle
that violating the statute requires intentional wrong
doing rather than accidental conduct.
"8 "Fraud is so inextricably woven into the term.
'willfully' as it is employed in 145(b), that it is cdearlv
Another line of reasoning attempting to bring
tax evasion within the scope of summary disbar-
ment is based upon the fact that in the indict-
ments for tax violations it is often alleged that the
defendant willfully and knowingly evaded the
payment of taxes by filing a false and fraudulent
return. A Conviction pursuant to this indictment,
it is contended, involvesfrazd as evidenced by the
indictment itself. The decisions relating to this
matter are in conflict and are discussed later.
Upon the introduction of evidence showing
moral turpitude, there is no question but that an
attorney will be disbarred for tax evasion under a
regular procedure. There is no corresponding
uniformity among the decisions relating to sum-
mary procedures.
The leading case in this area, and the strongest
case denying disbarment summarily, is In re
Hallihaiz, 9 wherein was enunciated the rules
applicable to these cases.' Reaffirming the premise
that fraud necessarily involves moral turpitude, it
was stated that there is no difference between
defrauding an individual and defrauding the
government. It was further declared that any
offense involving intentional dishonesty for per-
sonal gain is moral turpitude. Nevertheless the
court held that conviction of income tax evasion
will not invoke summary disbarment because a
conviction for the crime could be had without
showing fraud and, therefore, without moral
turpitude. The court felt bound by the federal
courts' interpretation of the federal income tax
an ingredient of the offense proscribed by that section.
Only by creating unwarranted semantic distinctions
could a contrary conclusion be reached." Chanan Din
Khan v. Barber, 147 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
19 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 (1954).
20 Judge Traynor, speaking for the California Su
preme Court, set out the "ground rules."
(1) "(I)t is settled that whatever else it (moral turpi-
tude) may mean, it includes fraud and that a
crime in which an intent to defraud is an essen-
tial element is a crime involving moral turpitude."
(2) "It is also settled that the related group of offenses
involving intentional dishonesty for purposes of
personal gain are crimes involving moral turpi-
tude."
(3) "We see no moral distinction between defrauding
an individual and defrauding the government ....
and an attorney whose standard of conduct should
be one of complete honesty..., who is convicted
of either offense is not worthy of the trust and con-
fidence of his clients, the courts, or the public, and
must be disbarred, since his conviction of such a
crime would necessarily involve moral turpitude."
(4) "Conversely, if a conviction for any crime can be
had without proof of facts showing moral turpi-
tude, an attorney convicted of such a crime cannot
he summarily disbarred .. ." 272 P.2d at 771.
[Vol. 49
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statute and examined a number of Supreme Court
cases which
"establish that fraud is not an essential element of
the offense proscribed by section 145(b), that some
measure of bad faith or evil intent is an essential ele-
ment, but that such bad faith or evil intent, which can
be inferred from evidence that the defendant acted
without justifiable excuse, without ground for believing
his acts were lawful, or in careless disregard of the law-
fulness of his acts, do not necessarily involve moral
turpitude."
The court emphasized that disbarment procedings
were based upon the conviction of a crime in-
volving moral turpitude and since the proceeding
was summary, the crime must necessarily and
inherently involve moral turpitude and this cannot
be affected by words added to the indictment by a
careful and overzealous prosecutor. The overall
effect of the Hallinan case was to firmly establish
the principle that income tax evasion is under no
circumstances grounds for a summary disbarment,
irrespective of an allegation of fraud in the indict-
ment.2 For several years the doctrine of the
Hallinan case remained unquestioned.2 '
The first deviations from the rule of the Hallinan
case-that a conviction for income tax evasion
does not necessarily involve moral turpitude and
that therefore a summary disbarment proceeding
will not be allowed-came in two federal deporta-
tion cases. In Chanan Din Khan v. Barber,2' the
government, in order to satisfy the requirements of
2 Answering the contention that Hallinan was guilty
of "false and fraudulent" conduct as charged in the in-
dilnent, the court said,
"The language of the statute itself clearly indicates
that an attorney can be summarily disbarred only when
the crime of which he was convicted involves moral
turpitude. Even if it is assumed that the statements in
the indictment or judgment of conviction describing
conduct that goes beyond the essential elements of
the crime charged are a part of the "record of convic-
tion" as the State Bar contends, the record of conviction
is "conclusive evidence" only when the crime itself
necessarily involves moral turpitude."
2' Kentucky State Bar Ass'n. v. McAfee, 301 S.W.2d
899, (Ky. 1957) (a per curiam opinion following the
Hallinay; case), Baker v. Miller, 138 N.E.2d 145 (Ind.
1956). The Indiana court, in what is certainly a sad
commentary on professional ethics, said, "This court
cannot bring itself to say that a willful attempt to evade
a tax imposed by statute, even if defined by the statute
as a felony, should automatically disbar an attorney
from his profession, and strip him from his livelihood in
which he probably has spent most of his life. True, an
attorney's conduct should be of the highest character,
but the difference between striving for perfection, and
the attainment of perfection in conduct, is a margin of
some width for all of us."
2'147 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
the deportation statute, had to prove that the
defendant had been convicted of a felony involving
moral turpitude. The only evidence introduced by
the government was the record of conviction for
income tax evasion upon indictments alleging
fraudulent returns. It was held that income tax
evasion involved moral turpitude and an order of
deportation was granted.
The court arrived at this conclusion by two
lines of reasoning. It first examined numerous
tax violation cases that to some degree supported
the contention that fraud is involved in a violation
of the Internal Revenue Code. (These cases, how-
ever, were not concerned with the same provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code; and in fact, the
statute involved in many of them specifically
declared fraud to be an element of the crime.) In
addition, the court held that fraud is so inextri-
cably woven into the term "willfully," as that term
is used in the tax evasion statute, that it is clearly
an ingredient of the offense. The case actually
equated the terms "fraud" and "willfullness."
Upon these two grounds the court ruled that tax
evasion necessarily involved moral turpitude.
The first case to strike directly at the rationale
of the Hallinan case was Tseung Chu v. Cornell.'
Here the court expressly rejected Halinan's
determination that an allegation of fraud in the
indictment was of no significance. Relying on
Chanan Din Khan, and the fact that in the Tseung
Chi; case fraud was alleged in the indictment, the
court concluded that moral turpitude is necessarily
and inherently involved in tax evasion cases and a
summary deportation proceeding was sanctioned.
The court, aware that the cases are in conflict,
restricted its holding to those cases where fraud is
alleged in the indictment, but did not foreclose the
possibility that the principle might be extended.
Here the law stood, with several state court
decisions holding that tax evasion did not neces-
sarily involve moral turpitude and two federal
cases holding that it did, when the supreme court
of the state of Washington was faced with the
question, in the case of In re Seijas,2' of whether or
not a lawyer who had been convicted of income tax
evasion should be summarily disbarred. The facts
were essentially the same as those in the Hallinao
case and the court examined that opinion and the
contrary federal cases of Chanan Din Khan and
24 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957).25-Wash.--, 318 P.2d 961 (1957). This is the first
case where an attorney was disbarred summarily for
income tax evasion upon the theory that moral turpi-
tude is a necessary ingredinet of that crime.
19581
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Tseung Chu. It chose to follow the lead of the recent
federal decisions and allowed summary disbar-
ment. The court felt bound by the federal courts'
interpretation of the federal income tax statute.
The court in Hallinan, it will be remembered,
came to the opposite conclusion concerning the
holding of the federal cases on whether fraud was
always present in tax evasion. The decision was
not limited, however, to a case where fraud was
alleged in the indictment. The absence of this
requirement in the majority opinion would seem to
indicate that the court would allow summary dis-
barment in every case of tax evasion, but a later
Washington case, In re Kindschi,26 involving the
revocation of a license to practice medicine,
limited its holding to a situation where fraud was
alleged in the indictment.
The Illinois Supreme Court faces a similar
situation in the Teitelbaum case. It must decide, in
a case of first impression in Illinois, whether an
attorney who has been convicted of income tax
evasion should be disbarred in a summary proce-
dure. It must also consider the significance of an
allegation, or the lack of it, of fraud in the indict-
ment. On the first question the courts are in direct
conflict. California, Indiana, and Kentucky are
committed to a denial of summary disbarment in
all cases of tax evasion. Washington, supported by
recent federal deportation cases, would likely
allow summary disbarment in all cases and defi-
nitely so in those cases where fraud is alleged in
the indictment. As to the second issue, the opinions
are not clear and it may well be that whatever
decision the Illinois supreme court makes con-
cerning the effect of the terms of the indictment
will have a seftfng effect on the law in this area.
The issues now before the Illinois court will
undoubtedly face numerous courts in the near
future. In most jurisdictions, as in Illinois, there
is no authority upon which a decision may be
based. The decision in the Teitelbaum case will
very likely have a great influence upon future
litigation. To decide against summary disbar-
ment would likely end the recent trend of the
Washington and federal cases toward a moral
liberal application of moral turpitude to income
tax evasion cases. On the other hand if the Illinois
26-Wash.-, 319 P.2d 824 (1958). It is interesting
to note that the medical ethics committee only sus-
pended Kindschi for eight months, whereas the attorney
-In re Seijas was disbarred indefinitely. The court said
that they would not interfere with the committee
recommendation but in light of the Seijas disbarment
period, Kindschi was being treated too lightly.
court follows the Seijas case, it will be a significant
step away from the influence of the Hallinan
doctrine.
The question to be ultimately answered by the
Illinois court is whether tax evasion is so serious
an offense as to preclude an attorney from offering
mitigating evidence when faced with disbarment.
It is submitted that the recent federal and Wash-
ington cases reflect a changing attitude toward tax
evasion. No longer can the analysis of Judge
Learned Hand-that the public does not look
down on the tax evader-be sustained.Y It is
especially important that an attorney, who has
been commissioned by the people to uphold the
integrity of the law, show the highest regard and
respect for those laws he has vowed to protect.
Surely no one can be asked to know and under-
stand the law better than an attorney, and since
the courts have charged an alien with under-
standing the moral turpitude implications of tax
evasion, no less can be demanded of an officer of
the court. It is hoped, therefore, that the Illinois
supreme court, in order to foster the trust and
confidence of the public in the legal profession, will
deem the evasion of taxes an offense for which
disbarment can be ordered upon the sole evidence
of the record of conviction.n
27 United States ex rel Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d
429 (2d Cir. 1940). Judge Learned Hand dissented on
the grounds that while tax evasion is a crime, the pub-
lic does not consider it a serious moral deviation and it
is therefore not moral turpitude.
28 The Illinois supreme court handed down a decision
in the Teitelbaum case after this paper had been com-
pleted. In re Teitelbaum, Civil No. 34490, Ill., May 21,
1958. The court held that his evasion of income taxes
involved moral turpitude and he was suspended from
the practice of law for three years.
The court re-affirmed its earlier holdings that a con-
viction of a crime involving moral turpitude is ground
for disbarment. (See footnote 2, supra.) The court also
concluded, citing the Jordan case, (footnote 13, supra)
that whatever else "moral turpitude" meant, a crime in
which fraud was involved was a crime involving moral
turpitude.
The courts holding seems predicated upon the fact
that fraud was alleged in the indictments. This is
certainly contra to the Hallinan case, but in line with the
Seijas case if that decision was modified by the later
Kindschi case.
"It will be noted that section 145(b) is not specifically
couched in terms of fraud but speaks in terms of will-
ful intent to evade. A conviction under the section
necessitates a finding that the willful-intent-to-evade
element therein was proved. In our view such a finding
tends strongly to import fraud in a prosecution thereunder.
Furthermore, each of the six counts of the indict
ment ... charged that the respondent 'did wilfully and
knowingly attempt to defeat and evade a large part of
the taxes due' by filing a 'false and fraudulent' tax re-
turn.
Despite the charge of fraud in each of the iudict-
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